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ABSTRACT
We propose a novel neural network architecture for detecting in-
trusions on the CAN bus. The Controller Area Network (CAN) is
the standard communication method between the Electronic Con-
trol Units (ECUs) of automobiles. However, CAN lacks security
mechanisms and it has recently been shown that it can be attacked
remotely. Hence, it is desirable to monitor CAN traffic to detect
intrusions. In order to detect both, known and unknown intrusion
scenarios, we consider a novel unsupervised learning approach
which we call CANet. To our knowledge, this is the first deep learn-
ing based intrusion detection system (IDS) that takes individual
CAN messages with different IDs and evaluates them in the mo-
ment they are received. This is a significant advancement because
messages with different IDs are typically sent at different times
and with different frequencies. Our method is evaluated on real
and synthetic CAN data. For reproducibility of the method, our
synthetic data is publicly available. A comparison with previous
machine learning based methods shows that CANet outperforms
them by a significant margin.
1 INTRODUCTION
Automobiles are getting more and more connected by technolo-
gies such as Bluetooth, Wifi or smart phone plug-ins. While this
simplifies the driver’s life, it simultaneously opens new paths for
potential remote attacks on the Electronic Control Units (ECUs) of
cars. Hijacking an ECU can allow attackers to place messages on the
vehicle-internal communication network and, thus, e.g. to invoke
sudden breaking or turning off the engine which can, potentially,
cause traffic accidents [1, 10]. This may have even more disastrous
outcomes in autonomous vehicles. Hence, detecting the attempt of
attacks in car networks is in the interest of traffic safety.
In this paper, we focus on the CAN bus as it is the most com-
mon vehicle bus standard. Typically, CAN messages are used to
transmit signals between ECUs. For example, an ECU can send the
information about objects on the road so that the break assist can
react accordingly. An extensive overview about previous work on
CAN intrusion detection systems can be found in [18]. A strong
focus lies on rule based and statistical methods to detect known
attack scenarios. While many types of intrusions can be detected
efficiently by these approaches, the configuration of such an IDS
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is time-consuming, requires domain expertise, and it is unlikely
that unknown attack scenarios can be detected. Moreover, it is chal-
lenging to generate rules that capture the underlying behavior of
signals or physical dependencies between them.
With the advances in deep learning in the recent years [3, 6,
7], new tools are becoming available that have the potential of
detecting unknown attacks. Prior work on intrusion detection with
neural networks on single CAN signals can be found in the literature
[17, 21, 22]. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no
neural network architecture that can handle the CAN bus data
structure in the signal space. On the CAN bus, at every point in
time at most one message is transmitted. As a result the CAN traffic
consists of consecutive messages with different IDs. These messages
contain different kinds of signals (see Table 1). The data structure
makes it difficult to feed the data of the CAN bus directly into any
kind of standard neural network.
The contributions of this manuscript are the following: We intro-
duce CANet, a novel neural network architecture tailored to work
on the signal space of CAN data and we show that it outperforms
baseline methods by a significant margin. For each message ID
we introduce one separate long short-term memory (LSTM) [4]
subnetwork with input dimension equal to the number of signals
from the message of that particular ID. The output of the LSTM
subnetworks is concatenated to a single latent vector that encodes
the current state of the entire CAN traffic. This vector is followed by
several fully connected layers in an autoencoder setting to finally
reconstruct the payload of the input message. We describe how
this architecture can be trained in an unsupervised manner and
evaluated in such a way that a variety of unknown attack types can
be detected while identifying normal data correctly. We show that
our method is especially strong in finding certain manipulations
of signals that are difficult to detect by classical approaches (e.g.
the continuous change of a signal towards a desired value). Hereby,
we exploit the fact that by processing the joint latent vector the
network is able to learn the functional dependencies of the signals
under consideration.
We point out that anomaly detection in the signal space of CAN
bus data may have other applications beyond intrusion detection
e.g. early detection of technical failures.
This document is organized in the following way: In Section 2,
the background of the CAN bus and the relevant literature on
CAN IDS is briefly covered. In Section 3, the proposed network
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CAN Bus Data after Preprocessing
Time Stamp ID Signals of A Signals of B Signals of C Signals of D
1.045 B - - - - - - 54.71 0 7.24 - - - -
3.102 D - - - - - - - - - - - - 31.47
4.978 A 12 44.15 38.02 2 0 1 - - - - - - -
7.014 C - - - - - - - - - 17.79 7 2 -
8.993 B - - - - - - 55.02 1 7.21 - - - -
9.750 A 13 44.01 39.67 1 0 2 - - - - - - -
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
Table 1: Schematic representation of CAN bus data after preprocessing its bytes to signals. Note, that at each time stamp only
the signal values of a single ID are transmitted. Different IDs may contain a different number of signals, e.g. ID A consists of
six signals whereas ID D has one signal. The time stamp is given in milliseconds. In CANet, the time is discretized.
architecture and its training process is described. In Section 4, the
method is evaluated on real and synthetic CAN data and compared
to related work. Finally, in Section 5, we present our conclusions
and future work.
2 RELEVANT BACKGROUND
2.1 Terminology
The Controller Area Network (CAN) is a vehicle bus standard de-
signed to allow automotive Electronic Control Units (ECUs) to
communicate with each other.
A CAN message is characterized by a time stamp, an ID and
typically an 8-byte payload field. The ID represents the type of
the current message and the payload field is used to communicate
current values of vehicle signals. Each ID is associated with a set of
signals and the payload of messages carrying this ID provides their
current values. In general, messages with different IDs contain a
different set of signals. The encoding of signal values ranges from
single bits to several bytes of the payload. A so-called CAN matrix
provides information for each ID, specifying which payload bits
encode which signal. In this paper, we assume that the decoding
of raw payload bits into signal values is already performed (see
Table 1).
2.2 Objective
The objective is to detect intrusions into the CAN bus communi-
cation. We assume that the attacker has already gained access to
the CAN bus, e.g. by hijacking one of the connected ECUs. This
follows the path of demonstrated security relevant attacks [10]. We
further assume that an attacker now tries to influence the vehicle
behavior by manipulating messages.
Our goal is to detect signals deviating from their “normal” behav-
ior or signals breaking out of physical relationships. These physical
relationships are typically complex, potentially unknown and hard
to derive by rule based intrusion detection systems for CAN.
2.3 Related Research
In this section, we discuss previous approaches for intrusion de-
tection on CAN bus data. In [17], a LSTM network structure for
predicting the next payload of a single ID is proposed. Other deep
learning based results include [22], where an autoencoder like net-
work architecture is used on a sliding window over the appearances
of a specific signal. In [21], a lightweight on-line detector of anom-
alies (LODA) is proposed. While these methods show promising
results, they all build a model for a single time series containing
the values from one signal or signals of one ID. We extend this by
enabling the network to work with all signals of multiple CAN IDs
simultaneously. This gives CANet the advantage that it can detect
intrusions by inferring functional or physical dependencies that
appear between signals on the CAN bus.
Non neural network based methods for anomaly detection on
the CAN bus payload include signature based methods [15], fin-
ger printing [2], clustering methods [19], fuzzy logic [9], Hidden-
Markov-Model based methods [12], and entropy based methods
[8, 11]. A comprehensive review of the strengths and weaknesses of
these and other non-payload based methods can be found in [18].
3 CANET
The basic idea of CANet is to handle the challenging structure of
CAN data by introducing several independent recurrent neural
networks on the input side. This enables the network to learn tem-
poral dependencies in the signals. In detail, we introduce a separate
LSTM for each ID that gets the signal values associated to this ID
as inputs and that stores the current state of the processed data.
The state of the whole CAN traffic is then represented by a joint
latent vector that is realized as concatenation of the current states
of all input networks. This vector does not contain any information
about what ID has been processed last. To enable an unsupervised
learning setting, the joint latent vector is fed into a subnetwork of
consecutive linear layers in an autoencoder setting. That is, at each
time step the task of this subnetwork is to reconstruct the signal
values of each possible input message solely based on the current
joint latent vector. The deviation between the signal values of the
true input message and its reconstruction is then used as a measure
for the normality of the input message. Since the network is solely
trained on normal data, it is expected that this reconstruction error
is small on normal data and large on anomalous data.
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Figure 1: Schematic representation of the CANet architecture for intrusion detection on CAN bus data. Each ID has its own
LSTM input model. When the payload st,Ai of an ID is fed into its input model, only the corresponding memory in the joint
latent vector is updated. The entire latent vector is used to reconstruct the signals of all IDs. The deviation between the true
input payload and the corresponding reconstruction is used for anomaly detection.
3.1 Network Architecture
In order to describe the network architecture efficiently, we first
establish some notations. Let A = {A1, . . . ,AK } be the ordered
set of all K ∈ N considered IDs. For each ID A ∈ A we take nA
corresponding signals into account that are encoded in the payload.
We denote the total number of signals by N . Whenever an IDA ∈ A
is observed at time step t , we denote the vector containing the
corresponding signal values by st,A ∈ RnA . Note that we hereby
discretize the time.
A visualization of the architecture can be found in Figure 1 and
the corresponding layer specifications in Table 2. The network archi-
tecture consists of an input LSTM subnetwork for every ID A ∈ A.
The i-th LSTM subnetwork is associated with ID Ai , has nAi in-
puts, and a hidden dimension of size nAi · hscale . Here, hscale ∈ N
represents the computational power of CANet. In the evaluation
part, the performance with different hscale values is compared (see
section 4.4). Whenever a new payload of an IDA ∈ A is fed through
the corresponding LSTM subnetwork, its output of size nA · hscale
is used to update the corresponding memory in the joint latent
vector. Hence, the joint latent vector has length N · hscale . It rep-
resents and stores the current state of the CAN traffic. The joint
latent vector is followed by a set of fully connected layers where
the penultimate layer has strictly less neurons than the output layer,
which has N neurons. The task of the output layer is to reconstruct
all potential current input signals from all IDs.
During training, at each time step t ∈ N the payload of an ID, Ai
say, is fed through its corresponding LSTM input model. It then is
used to update the joint latent vector in order to reconstruct the
payload at time step t for all A ∈ A. Formally, the reconstruction
Rt of the payload for the time step t is denoted by
Rt (st,Ai ) = (Rect (st,A1 ), . . . ,Rect (st,AK )),
where Rect (st,Aj ) denotes the reconstruction of the payload asso-
ciated to ID Aj .
CANet Architecture
Layer Type Size
LSTM per ID Number of Signals of ID × hscale
Joint Latent Vector N × hscale
Fully Connected (ELU) N × hscale/2
Fully Connected (ELU) N − 1
Fully Connected (ELU) N
Table 2: CANet architecture for detecting intrusions on the
CAN bus. A total number of N signals is considered. The pa-
rameter hscale ∈ N determines the computational power of
the neural network and is specified in the evaluation part.
We then compare the true signal values from the payload of the
current ID Ai with their reconstructions Rect (st,Ai ). We use the
quadratic error loss function, given by
loss(st,Ai ) = | |Rect (st,Ai ) − st,Ai | |2ℓ2 . (1)
In detail, when computing the back propagation with respect to
this loss function, only the gradients of the weights for the LSTM
subnetwork of ID Ai and the weights that connect the joint latent
vector with the output Rect (st,Ai ) must be computed.
Since the temporal dependencies are stored for each ID separately
in the corresponding LSTM subnetwork, the training process has
the advantage that the model as a whole is not sensitive to the exact
order of consecutive message IDs. In fact, in real CAN data, there is
some variability in the order of IDs, even within the same data set.
3.2 Anomaly Score
The quadratic error between the signal and its reconstruction as
defined in Equation 1 can be used to predict whether or not a signal
at time step t ∈ N is anomalous. This prediction can be made
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by testing if the error is above a fixed threshold. Due to the fact
that we consider an unsupervised learning problem, the threshold
must be chosen solely based on normal data. It is computed for
each signal separately and is given by the 99.99% percentile of all
corresponding quadratic errors on a validation data set. During
evaluation, an individual anomaly indicator is stored for every
signal. Every time an ID is processed by the model, the anomaly
indicator of the respective signals is updated and set to 1 if the
reconstruction error exceeds the corresponding 99.99% percentile
and set to 0 otherwise. The global anomaly score at a time step t
is set to 1 if and only if at least one of the stored signal anomaly
indicators is 1 and set to 0 otherwise.
Note that this anomaly score is only feasible if the number of sig-
nals does not get too large because it suffers from similar effects as
multiple testing problems. That is, if the number of signals becomes
too large, the probability that a normal data point is identified as
such (true negative) decreases.
While this anomaly score is good for demonstrating the capabil-
ities of our method, it may need to be refined for in-vehicle usage,
where a 100% true negative rate is required because the cost of each
false positive is relatively high. That is, depending on the response
mechanism this might have consequences such as recommending
the driver to stop or see a mechanic due to an attack.
4 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we evaluate our method on both, real and synthetic
CAN data.
The real data was collected on a test vehicle. In our experiments,
13 IDs with a total number of 20 signals are taken into consideration.
The signals are chosen in such a way that they contain physical
values and that, for each signal, there is at least one other signal with
a functional dependency to it. We divide about 13 hours of recorded
data into 12.5 hours of training and 0.5 hours of test data. We only
consider data representing the normal driving mode. Hence, we
exclude e.g. starting and turning off the engine. All payloads are
preprocessed into their signal value space (see Table 1).
In the case of the synthetic data, we consider a data set consisting
of 10 different message IDs, each with different amounts of signals
per ID and different noisy time frequencies. The total amount of
signals is 20. The data is created in such a way that it is similar,
based on our experience, to real CAN traffic. The data contains
physical values, counters and signals that are dependent on one
or multiple other signals. We use a training data set of about 16.5
hours and a test data set of about 7.5 hours of CAN traffic. The data
set is available at https://github.com/etas/SynCAN.
4.1 Simulated Attacks
In both, the real and the synthetic data set, the test data is divided
into six subsets of equal time length. We use one subset to evaluate
our model on normal data. The other five test data sets are used to
evaluate our model on the following attack types:
(1) Plateau attack: A single signal is overwritten to a constant
value over a period of time, i.e. a jump or freezing the signal.
We only consider jumps in the typical signal range. Higher
jumps represent a clear attack. For example, a car cannot
speed up from 20 km/h to 100 km/h within 10 ms. Such
attacks might be detected just by considering the respective
signal. Smaller jumps or freezing might only be detected if
we consider a set of signals with some kind of correlation
between them.
(2) Continuous change attack: A signal is overwritten so that
it slowly drifts away from its true value. This assumes that
the attacker wishes to set a signal to a concrete value while
trying to fool the IDS with realistic small changes in the
signal.
(3) Playback attack: A signal value is overwritten over a period
of time with a recorded time series of values of that signal.
The attacker hopes to trick the IDS by sending completely
real looking signal values of a different traffic situation.
(4) Suppress attack: The attacker prevents an ECU from sending
messages, for example, by turning it off. This kind of attack
means that messages of some particular ID do not appear in
the CAN traffic for some period of time.
(5) Flooding attack: The attacker sends messages of a particular
ID with high frequency to the CAN bus. This attack is easier
to perform in praxis then the aforementioned ones, since the
attacker does not need to control an ECU. It only requires
to send additional messages to the CAN bus in order to
“overwrite” the real message values.
The length of a typical attack interval, in both the real and the
synthetic data set, is between 2-4 seconds. In each synthetic test
data set are about 100 and in each real test data set about 10 attack
intervals of the corresponding type. The suppress and flooding
attack can be relatively easily detected with a rule based method
by analyzing the frequencies of the signals. However, the plateau,
continuous change and playback attack are rather difficult to be
detected with a rule based system. Furthermore, for all three attacks
it is often not sufficient to only consider each signal separately. For
example, in the playback attack it is mostly impossible to detect
the majority of an attack interval if no access to some correlated
signals is given.
4.2 Network Training Details
In this section, we present the training details of our method in
order to make the results reproducible. All code for training and
evaluation is written with pyTorch [13]. We use the network ar-
chitecture described in Table 2 for different hscale values. The
optimizer of choice is Adam [5] with a initial learning rate of 0.01.
The data is signal wise 0-1 scaled. We train the network for 1000
epochs with batch size 25. Every element in a batch is a series
of 5000 consecutive messages at random starting position in the
training data. At the beginning of each epoch the hidden and cell
state vector of all LSTM models are initialized with zero. During a
single epoch, a back-propagation is performed every 250 iterations
(time steps) in order to update the network weights. For a more
robust training, the loss function is multiplied by a fixed scalar
for different IDs. That is, the scalar is linearly smaller the more
frequent its corresponding ID appears in the training data set. This
is to ensure that IDs that appear more often do not get more weight
than less frequent IDs during training.
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The training is performed on the training data set after removing
a small portion of the data that is used to compute the thresholds
for the anomaly score.
4.3 Comparison with Related Research
CANet is the first approach capable of handling the data structure
of CAN bus data with multiple CAN IDs simultaneously within a
single neural network model. Therefore, a one to one comparison
with an existing method is not possible. In order to compare CANet
with a baseline, we adapted the following methods:
(1) Predictive Baseline: In [17], the basic idea is to learn a separate
model for each ID. At each time step, the model predicts the
payload of the next occurrence of its associated ID. The net-
work directly processes the bit representation of the payload.
As preprocessing step, the raw data is fed to a subnetwork of
linear layers. The output is then processed by a combination
of LSTM and linear layers that perform the prediction. The
difference between the true value and the prediction is used
for the anomaly score. We train one predictive model per
ID. Since we have access to the signal representation of the
payload, we omit the preprocessing subnetwork and feed the
signal values directly into the LSTM layers that are followed
by a set of linear layers.
(2) Autoencoder Baseline: In [22], an autoencoder model for a
single signal is used. That is, at time step t the network
has the task to reconstruct the input vector that consists
of the signal values on a sliding window at the time steps
(t − 7, . . . , t). We use their network architecture to obtain
one model for each signal.
Following our approach in section 3.2, we use the 99.99% percentile
of the quadratic errors on a validation set (signal wise) to combine
it to a final anomaly score.
4.4 Evaluation
In this section, we describe the numerical findings of CANet and
compare them with the related research. For both, the real data and
the synthetic data, we evaluate models of different hscale sizes i.e.
for hscale ∈ {5, 10, 20, 30} (see Table 2). Note that for comparability
reasons no extra tuning of the network architecture for the different
hscale values is made. A summary of the numerical results can be
found in Table 3. The accuracies, true positive rates (i.e. rate of
attacks that where successfully detected) and true negative rates
(i.e. rate of normal data that was found to be normal) presented in
the table are computed point wise. At the end of this section, we
introduce an interval based evaluation criterion that might be more
meaningful for real applications.
We find that in the real as well as in the synthetic data setting
the models identify normal data correctly in a solid way, with an
accuracy typically larger than 0.99. The attack types plateau, con-
tinuous change and playback are detected reliably. The plateau and
the playback attack show particular high detection rates, typically
in the range of [0.85, 0.955]. The continuous change attack has a de-
tection rate normally larger than 0.70. Note that this is an excellent
performance since the evaluation is done point wise. That is, we
usually detect the vast majority of each attack interval (see Figure
2). Our approach outperforms the predictive and the autoencoder
baseline by a significant margin. Typically, the baseline approaches
only detect the first few attacked messages of the attack interval
but identify the rest of the interval as normal (see Figure 3). As
expected, the baseline approaches perform particularly poorly on
the playback attack. This is because if only a single signal of the
CAN traffic is taken into account, deviations in the group of signals
that have physical dependencies cannot be exploited.
For comparison, we also evaluate our models on two other com-
mon attack types: suppress and flooding. These attacks can be
detected by a rule based approach in a straight forward way, e.g.
by analyzing the frequencies of each ID. Although our model does
not have access to the time stamp and is therefore not specifically
designed to find such attacks, it turns out that it still detects flood-
ing attacks with a high true positive rate, whereas it struggles to
detect suppress attacks. This is expected since the values that are
added with a high frequency into the CAN bus during a flooding
attack are much easier to be found than the gradual change of the
network state that is the consequence of not sending a certain ID
at all. When comparing with the baselines, we find that CANet is
superior in all aspects. Nevertheless, both, the predictive and the
autoencoder baseline, show relatively good results on the flooding
attack. This is because in between the messages from the flooding
attack the normal data points are still taken into account. Hence,
during a single attack interval many anomalous large jumps in
signal values can be found.
We find that the different choices for the parameter hscale have
a relatively low effect on the performance of the models. Even
small models with hscale = 5 perform reasonably well. This is
especially interesting for a potential use of such models on an
embedded device where memory and computational power are
limited. Nevertheless, for the synthetic data set, we see a significant
decrease in performance in the case hscale = 30. We believe this
is due to overfitting. Of course, more parameters of the network
architecture could be changed, e.g. the size of the autoencoder
bottleneck, to prevent overfitting for large hscale values.
When comparing the models on the real and synthetic data, we
find that the performance is in a similar range in most cases. We
believe that the synthetic data set is a good benchmark to test
models for a CAN IDS, even if the data looks somewhat “cleaner”
than in the real case.
Some of the synthetic data is visualized in Figure 2, which con-
tains the plots of four different signals on the same time interval.
In the signal of the upper right plot B, a playback attack has been
injected. The attack interval is visualized by the shade in all plots.
We observe that for all signals the reconstruction on normal data
is usually really accurate, while during the attack interval devia-
tions between the true data and its reconstruction can be found.
Note that this deviation also appears in signals that are not explic-
itly attacked but only correlated in some way with the attacked
signal, whereas signals without any correlations stay unaffected.
Furthermore, over an attack interval typically not the entire attack
is detected as such. This is expected, because an attacked signal and
its original counterpart may have similar values in some parts of the
attack window. For example, in case of a continuous change attack
the modified signal values lie in a realistic range at the beginning
of the attack. As a consequence, the model detects an attack only
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Evaluation Table
Synthetic Data
Model Specification Accuracy True Positive Rate / True Negative Rate
Method hscale No Attack Plateau Continuous Playback Suppress Flooding
CANet 5 0.991 0.896 / 0.980 0.740 / 0.994 0.896 / 0.997 0.496 / 0.996 0.900 / 0.997
CANet 10 0.990 0.955 / 0.975 0.765 / 0.994 0.905 / 0.996 0.613 / 0.996 0.901 / 0.996
CANet 20 0.992 0.885 / 0.993 0.771 / 0.996 0.906 / 0.997 0.581 / 0.995 0.884 / 0.997
CANet 30 0.995 0.707 / 0.996 0.446 / 0.997 0.630 / 0.998 0.184 / 0.997 0.625 / 0.997
Predictive - 0.996 0.330 / 0.974 0.015 / 0.994 0.020 / 0.996 0.003 / 0.993 0.644 / 0.994
Autoencoder - 0.983 0.355 / 0.927 0.016 / 0.975 0.029 / 0.995 0.001 / 0.993 0.688 / 0.995
Real Data
Model Specification Accuracy True Positive Rate / True Negative Rate
Method hscale No Attack Plateau Continuous Playback Suppress Flooding
CANet 5 0.996 0.937 / 0.963 0.792 / 0.975 0.852 / 0.911 0.082 / 0.997 0.808 / 0.943
CANet 10 0.994 0.913 / 0.988 0.701 / 0.985 0.878 / 0.977 0.176 / 0.989 0.802 / 0.996
CANet 20 0.995 0.936 / 0.968 0.724 / 0.988 0.862 / 0.954 0.254 / 0.991 0.761 / 0.992
CANet 30 0.992 0.936 / 0.970 0.740 / 0.983 0.903 / 0.940 0.240 / 0.983 0.833 / 0.994
Predictive - 0.995 0.269 / 0.949 0.577 / 0.985 0.134 / 0.964 0.001 / 0.998 0.182 / 0.998
Autoencoder - 0.999 0.055 / 0.992 0.491 / 0.983 0.079 / 0.977 0.007 / 0.995 0.627 / 0.996
Table 3: Summary of experimental results on real and synthetic CAN data. For normal test data the accuracy is recorded. For
data with attacks the true positive rate, i.e. rate of attacks that are successfully detected, and the true negative rate, i.e. rate of
normal data that is found as such, are recorded. Note that this is a pointwise evaluation criterion.
after the deviation between the original and the modified signal
exceeds a certain threshold.
Since we believe that in real application, finding a large number
of attack intervals is more important than a high overall point
wise accuracy on attacks (i.e. true positives), we investigate this by
redefining what it means that an attack is found (see Figure 4). That
is, we define an attack as the entire period of time during which
the attack is performed, i.e. an attack interval. We compute the
percentage of attack intervals that are detected. Here, the criterion
for identifying an interval as anomalous is that at least P% of that
interval is detected point wise as anomaly. We can see in Figure 4
that based on this definition CANet finds most anomaly intervals
if P% does not get too large. This is true for both the real and the
synthetic data case. However, both baseline methods have very
low detection rates of anomaly intervals even for small P% (see
Figure 4).
Summing up the results, we find that CANet is capable of reliably
detecting attacks on signals that have functional dependencies,
while performing solidly on normal data. Our main findings are:
(1) The presented architecture is the first method that is capa-
ble of handling the difficult data structure from signals of
multiple CAN IDs in a single model.
(2) CANet outperforms the selected baseline CAN IDS methods
by a significant margin on all selected evaluation criteria.
(3) Our model has an excellent true negative rate and is capable
of detecting unknown intrusions robustly.
4.5 Risks and Benefits of Neural Network
Based IDS Models
The biggest advantage of using machine learning based approaches,
such as the one presented in this manuscript, is that they are po-
tentially capable of detecting unknown intrusions. That is, they are
successful in a task in which most other methods fail. Classically,
for each possible attack scenario, a defense mechanism must be
chosen. However, this process is highly time consuming and re-
quires a significant amount of CAN bus domain expert knowledge
for a successful detection. Here, neural networks significantly re-
duce both, the development time and the required CAN domain
knowledge.
On the other hand, the output ofmachine learning basedmethods
can be complicated to analyze which makes it difficult to execute
an automatic response once an intrusion is detected. Furthermore,
neural networks require a large amount of trainig data and are typ-
ically more computational expensive than many other approaches.
Another potential risk of using neural networks in a security setting
is that they can be sensitive to adversarial attacks [14, 16, 20].
4.6 Reproducibility
Typically, CAN bus based intrusion detection methods are tested
on real data. However, publishing real CAN traffic and the corre-
sponding CAN matrix is usually not possible, since it is considered
intellectual property by most car producers. Hence, to the best of
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Figure 2: The plots show four different signals of the synthetic CAN data set. They are extracted on the same time interval
along with their corresponding reconstruction of CANet. The different number of signal appearances in B compared with A,
C and D are a result of different message frequencies. A playback attack on B is performed. The corresponding attack interval
is shaded in all plots. An intrusion is detected by CANet if the anomaly score (red line) equals one. It can be seen that on non-
attacked data, the reconstruction (straight blue line) of the original signal (dashed black line) is almost exact. In the attack
interval, deviations between the true signal and its reconstruction cannot only be observed in B but also in A and C. This is
due to functional dependencies between these three signals. In contrast, D has no functional dependencies with A, B and C.
Therefore, it is unaffected by the attack. Note that not the entire attack interval is detected. This is because the attacked signal
is quite similar to the original signal for a short period of time.
Figure 3: Plot of the reconstruction as in Figure 2 using the
predictive baseline. This method only detects the first few
elements of the attacked interval correctly.
our knowledge, there is no standard data set for comparing meth-
ods. We try to close this gap by evaluating our model on both real
and synthetic data and we make the synthetic data publicly avail-
able1. We hope that this simplifies the work of future researchers
to compare their work with a baseline.
5 CONCLUSION
Cars are getting more and more connected. This opens ways for
attacking the CAN bus of automobiles remotely. Since attacks can
have a major impact on traffic safety, it is desirable that such attacks
are detected in a robust manner.
We present CANet, a novel neural network architecture that is
trained in a unsupervised manner to detect intrusions and anom-
alies on the CAN bus. Furthermore, it is the first model in the
literature capable of working on messages with different IDs si-
multaneously. The trained models have a high true negative rate,
typically over 0.99, which is necessary for real world applications.
1The data is publicly available at https://github.com/etas/SynCAN.
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Figure 4: The plot represents the ratio of detected attacks for each attack scenario. Here an attack is considered as the interval
in which the attack is performed. The criterion for an attack interval to be detected is: At least P% of the interval have been
point wise detected as attack (x-axis). The plots on the left hand side are based on our model with hscale = 10. By comparing
the plots, it can be seen that CANet outperforms the other two approaches.
Furthermore, along with the high true negative rate we are able
to detect a large amount of the unknown attacks, both on real and
synthetic data. Our method is the only one in the literature capable
of finding anomalies like the replay attack reliably. Although the
results show the capabilities of the method, for applying it in real
application further steps might be necessary. Those could include
tuning the network architecture or redefining the anomaly score.
For reproducibility of the method and in order to have a bench-
mark set for forthcoming approaches, our synthetic data is pub-
lished at https://github.com/etas/SynCAN.
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